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RICO AND THE FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES: REMOVING THE ADVERSARY FROM THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM?
If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, [the ox] shall be stoned: and
his flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall be quit.'
This passage from the Bible, often cited as the antecedent of modern
forfeiture law,2 does not discuss forfeitability of attorneys' fees. Similarly,
Congress did not specifically mention attorneys' fees in the amended
criminal forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 3 But attorneys defending persons charged with
RICO violations are in a unique position. They are "bona fide purchaser[s]
for value," exchanging their legal services for their fee.4 However, because
of the very nature of the service they provide, they must be on notice that the
money or property with which their fee has been paid, or will be paid, may
be subject to forfeiture. Yet it is possession of precisely this notice that
enables the government, under the amended forfeiture provisions of the
statute, to reach property transfered by a RICO defendant to a third party.5
As federal prosecutors have begun to seek either pretrial restraints on
potentially forfeitable assets, 6 or postconviction forfeiture of monies
1. Exodus 21:28 (Douay). The ox is considered 'tainted' by its evil act, independent of the owner's
guilt or innocence, and its life forfeited as penalty.
2. See Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMp. L.Q. 169 (1973).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 30-40.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (Supp. 1985).
This of course assumes the attorney is rendering bona fide legal services for the fee he is being paid.
The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from counseling or assisting a client in conduct
that a lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See, e.g., WASH. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2 (1985). If an attorney is not providing legitimate legal services for his fee, by definition, he is not a
bona fide purchaser. Consequently, under such circumstances the fee forfeiture issue does not arise.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. 1985). The amended forfeiture provisions provide that:
(in) . . . (2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in the property
which has been ordered forfeited to the United States . . . may . . petition the court for a
hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property ....
(6) If. . . the court determines...
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser. . . at the time of the purchase reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject toforfeiture.. . the court shall amend the order of
forfeiture ....
Id. (emphasis added).
6. SeeUnited Statesv. Rogers, 602F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). TheUnited StatesAttorney forthe
District of Colorado, pursuant to a RICO forfeiture indictment, sought a pretrial order restraining any
transferofthe defendants' potentially forfeitable assets. Due to the broad reach ofRICO indictments, see
infra note 27, such pretrial restraint orders frequently result in virtual indigence for the defendant.
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already paid to defendants' attorneys from such assets, 7 courts have been
called on to determine whether RICO's amended forfeiture penalties reach
attorneys' fees. 8
An analysis of the fee forfeiture issue is complicated by the variety of fact
patterns within which the issue can arise. Whether to seek pretrial restrain-
ing orders of accuseds' potentially forfeitable assets, or postconviction
forfeiture of fees, is clearly within the discretion of the government. It may
seek one, the other, both, or none. 9 Courts have generally resolved the fee
forfeiture issue strictly in terms of the facts before them without examining
the implications of their analysis for alternative exercises of governmental
discretion. '0 However, failure by the courts to consider the implications of
their analysis will lead to anomalous results in the future.
Analysis of the courts' application of RICO's amended forfeiture provi-
sions to attorneys' fees entails consideration of the language of the statute,
congressional intent, and the requirements of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments. That analysis leads to a conclusion that neither legislative history
7. See, e.g., indictment in a case currently pending before the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California. The indictment includes a paragraph specifically requesting the forfeiture of:
Any and all fees in the form of currency, real and/or personal property or other thing of value
payed or transferred after November 14, 1984 [the date of the arrest] by or on behalf of defendant to
the attorney(s) representing him or a codefendant, or as a result of this matter, which currency, real
and/or personal property or other thing of value was owned or possessed by defendant prior to the
transfer to said attorney(s).
United States v. Sheehan, No. CR-F-84-198 (E.D. Cal 1985), reprinted in Tarlow, Rico Report,
CHAMtPION. March 1986, at 35.
8. Although the fee forfeiture issue occasionally arose under the pre-amended statute, see e.g.,
United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976) (payment of potentially forfeitable assets to
attorney for fee not forfeitable); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (court may
restrain payment of potentially forfeitable assets to attorney for fee), this Comment is concerned only
with the forfeiture of attorneys' fees within the context of the amended statute's provisions. Pre-
amendment cases will be discussed only to the extent they address issues not related to interpretation of
the statutory language of the pre-amended statute.
9. For example, in Rogers the government sought a pretrial order restraining any transfer of the
accused's potentially forfeitable assets. 602 F. Supp. at 1334. In contrast, in United States v. Badala-
menti, the government did not seek a pretrial restraining order. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Rather. federal prosecutors served a subpoena duces tecum on the accused's attorney, subpoenaing all
records indicating the amount of fees paid by the accused to the attorney. Id. at 195. The government
stated it required the information because, inter alia, it intended to seek forfeiture of the fees subsequent
to conviction. Id. at 195-96. In United States v. lanniello, the government both obtained a pretrial
restraining order and notified defense attorneys that the government intended to seek forfeiture of any
fees paid prior to the imposition of the order. No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
In any event, the risk of fee forfeiture is always present in a RICO case regardless of whether the
indictment includes a forfeiture count, since indictments can always be amended.
10. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("Under the facts and circumstances of this case it is not necessary
• . . to determine whether the restraining order is improper because it deprives defendants of their right
to counsel of. . .choice.").
202
RICO and Attorneys' Fees
nor statutory language requires the inclusion or exclusion of attorneys' fees
from RICO forfeiture." Likewise, the right to counsel provided by the
sixth amendment, upon which some courts have relied, does not ade-
quately resolve the issue. 12 Instead, fifth amendment due process analysis
provides the requisite constitutional framework to resolve the fee forfeiture
issue. 13 Fifth amendment considerations compel recognition of a due
process right of the accused to use potentially forfeitable assets in his own
defense. 14
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
RICO, enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,15 represented the culmination of over 20 years of congressional effort
to investigate and address the problem of "organized crime."1 6 Congress
declared "[i]t is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States . . . by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime." 17 RICO was one such innovative remedy, designed to attack a
particularly insidious aspect of organized crime: its increased infiltration of
11. See infra text accompanying notes 45-72.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 73-122.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 123-32.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 133-44.
15. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
16. For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act, see
generally G. Blakey & B. Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980).
17. RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Actof 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1,84Stat.
922, 923. Although Congress' expression of purpose appears strong and unequivocal, "organized
crime" is not a phrase which lends itself to easy or consistent definition. As pointed out by Messrs.
Blakely and Gettings:
"Organized crime" is a phrase with many meanings. It is much like the fictional crime portrayed
in Akira Kurosawa's 1950 film, Rashoman, in which a ninth-century nobleman's bride is raped by
a bandit, and the nobleman lies dead. The film portrays versions of the double crime from the
perspectives of each of the three participants and a witness. Each version is different. So it is with
the definition of organized crime.
G. Blakey & B. Gettings, supra note 16, at 1013 n.15.
Indeed, strong dissent was voiced by several legislators who thought that Congress had proceeded
significantly beyond its original purpose when drafting the Act. See, e.g., the view of Senators Hart and
Kennedy in S. RE'. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969) ("But the reach of this bill goes beyond
organized criminal activity. . . . Amended to restrict its scope solely to organized criminal activity
and to assure the protection of individual rights, the bill could contribute important and useful means of
eradicating organized crime.").
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and influence over legitimate business enterprises.' 8 In other words, the
focus of RICO, unlike previous penal statutes, was and is on enterprise
criminality. 19
The full measure and extent of RICO's innovative attack on organized
crime is found in its criminal forfeiture penalty. RICO provides that a
defendant must forfeit to the United States upon conviction: (1) any interest
acquired in violation of its provisions (ill-gotten gains); and (2) any interest
affording a source of influence over any enterprise maintained in violation
of its provisions (economic base for illicit activities). 20 The statute also
authorizes the courts to enter pretrial restraining orders in connection with
any interest subject to forfeiture. 2'
By imposing forfeiture as a criminal sanction directly on an individual
defendant, RICO departed radically from previous forfeiture law. Tradi-
tionally, forfeiture in America always proceeded in rem, against the real or
personal property that had been put to illegal use. 22 The guilt or innocence
of the owner was irrelevant; it was enough that the property was used
18. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969):
What is needed here . . . are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also
with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic
power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
See also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("The legislative history clearly demon-
strates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots.").
19. Most statutes criminal ize specific acts; RICO criminalizes a pattern of conduct.
Essentially RICO prohibits four types of conduct: (1) the use of income derived from a "pattern of
racketeering activity" to acquire an interest in any "enterprise"; (2) acquisition of an interest in any
"'enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) conducting an "enterprise's affairs" through
a pattern of racketeering activity; and (4) conspiring to engage in any of the three types of conduct
previously listed. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982).
A pattern of racketeering activity is established when the accused commits at least two acts of related
racketeering activity within ten years of one another. Id. § 1961(5).
The predicate offenses constituting racketeering activity are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A)-(E).
The list includes such crimes as wire and mail fraud, as well as "any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (Supp. 1985). (emphasis added).
Most of the first decade of litigation subsequent to RICO's passage was devoted to resolution of the
"enterprise" issue (see, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)). the "interest" issue (see,
e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)), and the "pattern" issue (see, e.g.. United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975)).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
21. Id. § 1963(b).
22. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (1982) (forfeiture of property used in connection with illegal
gambling)id. § 1265 (forfeitureofbanned hazardoussubstancessold in interstatecommerce); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d) (1982) (forfeitureoffirearmsused illegally); id. § 1082(c) (forfeitureofships used inconnection
with illegal gambling); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982) (forfeiture of property used in violation of controlled
substance laws); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982) (forfeiture of vehicles used to transport contraband).
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illegally.23 RICO's forfeiture provisions, in contrast, proceed directly
against the individual. 24 The property is not forfeitable because of illegal
use, but because of a determination of the personal guilt of its owner.
Forfeiture is imposed as a criminal sanction on the defendant-it is im-
posed "in personam." 25 Given the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
the interests subject to criminal forfeiture,26 RICO defendants stand to lose
not simply property used in illegal activity, but very possibly the entirety of
their estates, both real and personal. 27 These forfeiture provisions repre-
sented the heart of Congress' efforts "to remove the profit from organized
crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains" 28 and to
"dislodge the forces of organized crime from legitimate fields of en-
deavor. "29
B. 1984 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act Amendments
In 1984 Congress passed the Comprehenisive Forfeiture Act of 1984
23. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,719 (1971) (in rem forfeiture is
based on the common law fiction that the subject of the forfeiture itself is guilty of wrongdoing).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
25. In personam forfeiture, however, is itself not new. It was frequently imposed under the English
common law. Calero-Taledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,682 (1974) ("[tlhe convicted
felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited
all his property, real and personal, to the Crown." (citations omitted)). However, in personam forfeiture
was not well received in the American colonies and the first Congress specifically prohibited forfeiture of
estates as a penalty for federal criminal convictions. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)). The Constitution also explicitly prohibits forfeiture of estate as a
penalty for treason beyond the lifetime of the traitor. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
For a general history of in personam forfeiture, see W. Hughes & E. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam
(Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition Into a
Modern Dilemma, II PEPPERDrNE L. REv. 613 (1984).
26. In Russello v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the "interests" subject to forfeiture
under RICO encompassed "all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds." 464
U.S. 16, 21 (1983). The interests subject to forfeiture were broadened still further when RICO was
amended by Congress in 1984. See infra text accompanying notes 30-40.
27. For example, assume that an indigent person initially violates RICO by dealing drugs. He
subsequently invests his drug profits, purchasing a legitimate business enterprise. This business, in turn,
begins to generate a substantial profit. With this newly gained wealth, derived from his legitimate
business, the RICO defendant begins to accumulate houses, cars, etc. Because the entirety of this
defendant's estate is derived from income produced initially from his illegal activity, it is all subject to
forfeiture. Although the primary source of the defendant's wealth may be his legitimate business enter-
prise, since the business itself was purchased with funds derived from illegal activity, the business, all of
the busniess' profit, and anything purchased with profits from the business, are all subject to forfeiture.
Fora more detailed discussionofthe operation ofRICO's forfeiture provisions, seegenerally G. Blakey &
B. Gettings, supra note 16, at 1035-37.
28. Russello, 464 U.S. at 28.
29. S. REP. No.91-617,91stCong., lst Sess. 79(1969) ("Whereanorganizationisacquiredorrunby
defined racketeering methods, then the persons involved can be legally separated from the organiza-
tion.").
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(hereinafter the amendments) amending RICO's forfeiture provisions. 30
The amendments were designed to "eliminate the statutory limitations and
ambiguities that [had] frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law
enforcement agencies."31 Specifically, Congress sought to resolve a circuit
court split on the forfeitability of illegal profits 32 and to close loopholes that
permitted defendants to defeat forfeiture by transferring or concealing their
forfeitable assets prior to conviction. 33
Essentially three measures were provided to address the pretrial asset
dissipation problem. First, pre-indictment restraining orders were autho-
rized subject to certain procedural safeguards. 34 Second, post-indictment
restraining orders were explicitly authorized ex parte. 35 Third, traditional
in rem "taint" theory was applied to in personam forfeitures.
30. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-44 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (Supp. 1985)).
31. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983).
32. Id. at 194, 197. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had held that the interests subject to
forfeiture were limited to "interests in the enterprise" and therefore RICO did not authorize forfeiture of
mere "profits and proceeds." United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court, in Russello v. United States.
held that illegal profits were included in the interests subject to forfeiture. 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983).
33. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 194-97 (1983) ("present criminal forfeiture statutes do
not adequately address the serious problem of a defendant's pretrial dispostion of his assets").
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(B)-(e)(2) (Supp. 1985). Congress was aware that in "complex criminal
cases, such as RICO. . . defendants become aware of the government's development of a case against
them and as a consequence have both the incentive and opportunity . . . to transfer or conceal
forfeitable assets before . . . restaining orders may be invoked." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 202 (1983). However, such pre-indictment restraining orders may only be issued:
(e)(1)(B) . . . if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and
opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that-
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture
and that the failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable . . . ; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested order
outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered . ...
(2) A [pre-indictment] temporary restraining order. . . may be entered. . . without notice or
opportunity for a hearing . . . if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to
believe that . . . provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(l)(B)-(e)(2) (Supp. 1985).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(I)(A) (Supp. 1985). Some courts, under the pre-amended RICO statute,
had required the government, before granting a temporary restraining order in criminal forfeiture cases,
to meet essentially the same stringent standards applicable to civil litigation temporary restraining
orders. See e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982). However, under the amended
forfeiture provisions, "[w ]hile the court may consider factors bearing on the reasonableness of the order
sought, it is not to 'look behind' the indictment . . . as a prerequisite to issuing a post-indictment
restraining order." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1983). Recently, the Ninth Circuit held
these amended preliminary injunction procedures unconstitutional for failure to provide the defendant.
and those with third party interests in the property subject to forfeiture, an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84
(9th Cir. 1985).
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1. The Amendments' Relation Back Provisions
The application of in rem "taint" theory to in personam forfeiture
through the amendments' relation back provisions is perhaps the most
radical change enacted therein. Under this theory, the property is "tainted"
as of the time of the illegal acts. The statute "relates back" the forfeiture of
the property to the time of the acts giving rise to the defendant's criminal
conviction. Forfeiture is considered to have occurred at the time of the
commission of the illegal acts. The defendant's, and any subsequent
transferee's, title in the property is retroactively divested. All "right, title,
and interest" in the forfeitable property is considered to have passed to the
"United States upon the commission of the [criminal] act. ",36
Congress recognized that the application of in rem relation back doc-
trines to in personam forfeiture presented problems. 37 Although the pur-
pose of the relation back provisions was to permit the voiding of transfers
that were not "arms' length" transactions, Congress did not intend that
they should operate to the detriment of innocent bona fide purchasers. 38
Accordingly, the amendments also established procedures whereby bona
fide purchasers of potentially forfeitable property could defend their prop-
erty interests and prevent forfeiture. 39
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 1985).
37. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. In in rem forfeiture proceedings the guilt of the
owner is irrelevant, whereas in in personam forfeiture it is essential.
38. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01 (1983).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. 1985):
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been
ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may . . . petition the court for a
hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held
before the court alone, without a jury ....
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that-
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, or
interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest
was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant. . . at the time of the commission of the acts
which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property
and was at the time of the purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture under this section;
the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination.
In a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that these amended preliminary injunction procedures are
unconstitutional for failure to provide the defendant, and those with third party interests in the property
subject to forfeiture, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985).
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2. Statutory Standard for Protecting Bona Fide Purchasers
The statutory standard for determining whether a bona fide purchaser
must forfeit property acquired from a RICO defendant is whether the
purchaser "was at the time of the purchase reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture."40 Because attorneys
defending persons charged with RICO violations must be on notice that the
money or property with which their fee has been paid, or will be paid, may
be subject to forfeiture, their fee would always be potentially forfeitable if
the statutory standard applied to attorneys. In addition to divesting recip-
ients of property received in sham transfers, the statute potentially divests
RICO criminal defense attorneys of their fees simply for providing bona
fide legal services to a particular class of defendants. The courts have,
therefore, in addition to looking to the language of the statute, analyzed the
fee forfeiture issue by looking to congressional intent and the requirements
of the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution.
II. ANALYSIS OF RICO'S AMENDED FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS AS APPLIED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
District courts have considered the attorney fee forfeiture question in
several different contexts. Some federal prosecutors, pursuant to RICO
forfeiture indictments, have sought pretrial orders restraining transfer of
the accused's potentially forfeitable assets. 41 In other cases, however,
federal prosecutors have not sought pretrial restraining orders. Rather, they
have simply notified defense counsel that they intended to seek forfeiture of
fees following conviction, or served counsel with subpoenas duces tecum
that called for the production of documentary evidence relating to defen-
dants' fee arrangements and payments to counsel. 42
Although the resolution of the fee forfeiture issue involves traditional
problems of statutory interpretation, courts have quickly recognized that
forfeiture of attorneys' fees raises constitutional questions. 43 Con-
sequently, courts have been mindful of the fundamental principle of stat-
utory interpretation that "in deciding among possible interpretations of a
statute, the court must select an interpretation that appears to be consistent
with the constitutionality of the statute." 44
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (Supp. 1985).
41. See, e.g.. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (D. Colo. 1985).
42. See. e.g.. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. See infra notes 73-132 and accompanying text.
44. United States v. lanniello. No, S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS. Genfed
library, Dist. tile) (citing Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970)); Rogers. 602 F. Supp. at 1339.
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Unfortunately, courts' analyses of fee forfeiture have been inadequate.
Although the plain language of the statute might appear to encompass
attorneys' fees, statutory interpretation based on plain language analysis is
incapable of addressing the constitutional problems raised by fee forfeiture.
Congressional intent, both as to the amendments in particular and RICO in
general, is ambiguous. Courts' efforts to resolve the issue through analysis
of the requirements of the sixth amendment have necessarily led to anoma-
lous results. However, the due process requirements of the fifth amendment
provide the proper analytic framework within which to balance the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in criminal forfeiture with the accused's interest
in a vigorous defense in terms of the adversarial nature of the American
system of criminal justice.
A. Statutory Language
In contrast to other federal forfeiture statutes, 45 RICO's amended for-
feiture provisions do not discuss the status of attorneys' fees. In view of the
unique position occupied by attorneys, many courts have therefore con-
cluded that the statutory language is inconclusive in resolving the fee
forfeiture issue.46
Courts have acknowledged that a literal reading of the statute seems to
encompass the fee.47 Nonetheless, courts have held that the constitutional
problems surrounding fee forfeiture48 were of sufficient weight that stat-
utory language could not resolve the issue without the use of unequivocal
language expressly directed to attorneys. 49
A minority of courts, in contrast, have remained unpersuaded that any
constitutional problems with fee forfeiture exist.50 These courts have con-
cluded that the statutory language plainly applied to attorneys' fees.51
45. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3671(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1985) (20% of potentially forfeitable profits from
convicted criminal's sale of media rights to depiction of crime may be used in defense of action for
forfeiture of profits).
46. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) (IThe statute says nothing
about whether attorney fees are forfeitable."); United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM)
(S.D.N.Y. September 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library. Dist. file) ("The plain language of section 1963
does not provide explicitly that attorneys' fees are forfeitable.").
47. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also United States v.
Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (D. Md. 1986) (interpreting the similar forfeiture language of 21
U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. 1985)).
48. See infra notes 73-132 and accompanying text.
49. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316 (interpreting the similar forfeiture language of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)
(Supp. 1985)); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; see also United States v. laniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115
(CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
50. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839,
849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51. Id.
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Washington Law Review
At least one court has argued that the amendments' notice test for
voiding preconviction property transfers applies as much to attorneys' fees
as it does to any other "transferee. "52 However, this reading is neither
required nor prohibited by the language of the statute itself. Statutory
interpretation arguments that rely on "plain meaning" are inherently
conclusory. 53 Frequently, what is "plain" to one court is shrouded in
ambiguity to another. Such is certainly the case with regard to RICO's
statutory language. 54 Moreover, acceptance of the plain meaning argument
does not obviate the necessity of analyzing the fee forfeiture issue within
the context of the Constitution. 55
B. Congressional Intent
Courts have examined both specific congressional intent in amending
RICO, as well as Congress' overall purpose in enacting RICO to resolve the
fee forfeiture issue. Several courts have focused on Congress' underlying
intent in amending the statute to include the relation back doctrine, 56
concluding that Congress did not intend to forfeit assets transferred to the
accused's attorney in payment for fees. 57 These courts hold that Congress
intended forfeiture to reach assets no longer held by the defendant only
when "the defendant has transferred [the assets] as some type of sham or
artifice." 58 The Senate committee considering the bill concluded that the
notice provision
should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as nominees of
the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transac-
tions. The standard for relief reflects the principles concerning voiding of
transfers set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 as amended by the bill. 59
52. Id.
53. See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975).
54. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp.
839, 849 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) with United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1346 (D. Colo. 1985).
55. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (forfeiture of bona fide
legal fees raises consitutional and ethical problems); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2,
1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Although RICO, as originally enacted, included a clause requiring liberal construction of its
provisions "to effectuate its remedial purposes," Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Gypsum Co. that such clauses are generally applicable only to civil remedies, not criminal penalties.
438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978). See also Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 308 (1983).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
57. United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985).
58. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
59. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 209 n.47 (1983).
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Because attorneys who receive funds for bona fide legal services engage in
neither a fraud nor sham, courts have reasoned, Congress did not intend
forfeiture to reach their fee.60
1. Inconclusiveness of the Amendments' Legislative History
In spite of the foregoing, congressional intent, as expressed by the
legislative history, is as inconclusive as the statutory language. The amend-
ments' legislative history is remarkable for the lack of discussion devoted to
the effect the proposed amendments would have on attorneys' fees.
61
Certainly, Congress was concerned with "address[ing] the serious problem
of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets." 62 But, as some courts
have emphasized, Congress did not intend to void legitimate transfers of
forfeitable assets to bona fide purchasers for value.63
The legislative history contains references to material that supports
either interpretation of the forfeiture provisions. On the one hand, a Senate
report cites one case 64 where the Third Circuit held an attorney's fee
forfeitable, 65 as a proper application of the relation back doctrine. 66 On the
other hand, the House Judiciary Committee stated:
[n]othing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. The Committee, therefore does not resolve the conflict
in District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a
60. United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985).
61. For example, in the summer of 1980 the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice held
hearings on the government's utilization of criminal forfeiture. Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds, 1980:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Forfeiture Effectiveness Hearings]. Much discussion was devoted to the
"Black Tuna" case which had recently received wide publicity in the news media. Id. at 51-60. In
United States v. Meinster, the "Black Tuna" case, the defendants had successfully imported over one
million pounds of of marijuana into the United States and grossed over 300 million dollars in one year
alone. United States v. Meinster, aff'd sub nom. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985 (5th Cir.
1981); Forfeiture Effectiveness Hearings at 52. In an unreported opinion the trial court held that the
defendants' attorneys' fees, approximately $500,000 were not subject to forfeiture. Id. at 53. The
government was able to obtain forfeiture of only $16,000. Id. The committee's discussion, however,
was focused not on the attorneys' fees the goverment was unable to reach, but on the reasons why the
government had been unable to obtain forfeiture of the other 250 million dollars. Id. at 53-57.
62. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1983).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
64. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
65. In Long, the court held that an airplane, purchased with proceeds from a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (1982) (the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute), and transferred by the defendant to his
attorney six months before conviction in payment of fees was forfeitable. Long, 654 F.2d at 917.
("Under these circumstances, two attorneys, experienced in criminal law, cannot be said to have
purchased the plane without notice of any outstanding claims against the goods.").
66. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 200 n.28 (1983).
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person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case. Compare United States v.
Meinster, (court approved post-indictment transfer of assets to defendant's
retained counsel): United States v. Mandel, (court denies order restraining
transfer of assets), with United States v. Bello, (court approves restraining
order because appointed counsel is available). 67
2. Purposes of RICO Do Not Compel Fee Forfeiture
Courts have also focused on the overall purpose of Congress in striking at
the economic base of organized crime to conclude that attorneys' fees are
forfeitable. 68 Thus one court reasoned that since the statute's purpose was
to prevent the racketeer from obtaining "a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a
crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of the Roll-Royce of
attorneys from these same tainted funds. "69
However, the ambiguity in the amendments' legislative history cannot be
resolved through consideration of the amendments within the context of
RICO's overall purpose and goals. Judicial reliance on Congress' general
objective in enacting RICO to resolve this ambiguity in the amendments'
legislative history is misplaced. 70 Two objectives underlie RICO's enact-
ment. First, the economic base Congress sought to undercut was the ability
of organized crime to use its economic power to infiltrate and pervert
legitimate economic enterprises. 71 Second, the general congressional ob-
jective underlying forfeiture was to separate a criminal from his ill-gotten
gains. 72 These objectives are achieved regardless of whether forfeiture
reaches the accused's attorney's fee.
Whether or not defense attorneys receive the potentially forfeitable asset
via their fee or the government obtains it through forfeiture, criminal
defendants have been "separated" from their ill-gotten gains and illegal
67. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98thCong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984) (citations omitted). Although
the quotation refers to amendments to the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848.
contained in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, the language is virtually identical with the
RICO forfeiture amendments. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 1985) with 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)
(Supp. 1985). See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2. 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. lanniello.
No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
69. /tire Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839.849
n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
70. Pavden focused on the congressional objective of striking at the economic base of organized
crime. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
72. Id.
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sources of influence over legitimate economic enterprises. Either disposi-
tion of the asset is logically consistent with the overall objectives of RICO.
Thus, analyzing the amendments within the overall context of RICO does
not resolve the ambiguity of either their statutory language or their legis-
lative history.
C. The Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants an absolute right
to counsel in federal criminal prosecutions in which imprisonment may be
imposed as a sentence. 73 Because the forfeiture of attorneys' fees directly
affects an accused's ability to engage counsel, courts have focused on the
requirements of the sixth amendment in analyzing the issue.74
Seeking to avoid statutory interpretations violative of the Constitution, a
majority of courts have held that attorneys' fees are not subject to forfeiture,
concluding that forfeiture of fees infringes on the accused's sixth amend-
ment rights. 75 Courts have considered whether forfeiture of attorneys'fees
unconstitutionally infringes on either of the two sixth amendment rights to
counsel: (1) the general right to assistance of counsel;76 and (2) the right to
counsel of one's own choice. 77 An analysis of these court decisions,
however, reveals that the sixth amendment does not lend itself to an
adequate solution of the fee forfeiture issue, either in terms of a general
right to counsel or the right to counsel of choice.
73. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342-45
(1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
74. United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ianniello, No.
S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614F. Supp. 194, 196-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);In re GrandJury Subpoena DatedJan. 2, 1985
(Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
75. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1317; United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-98; Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. at 1348-49.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. The lower federal courts have generally recognized a qualified sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice. See Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (" [I]t is clear that an
accused who is financially able to retain counsel of his choosing must not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity to do so"); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. La
Mont, 684 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 United States 1082 (1983); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207,209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974).
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1. Right to Assistance of Counsel
a. Fee Forfeiture's Effect on Defendants' Ability to Retain Paid
Counsel
Although one court has held that the forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not
infringe an accused's sixth amendment rights, 78 most courts have con-
cluded otherwise. 79 However, courts holding that forfeiture of attorneys'
fees infringes on the accused's general sixth amendment right to assistance
of counsel have done so only when the government has not sought pretrial
restraining orders on the transfer of potentially forfeitable assets.80 These
courts have focused on the practical effect the threat of forfeiture will have
on the accused's ability to retain counsel, and the effect the absence of a
restraining order will have on the accused's ability to qualify for court-
appointed counsel. 8'
Courts have reasoned that if fees are forfeitable, the threat of fee
forfeiture will, for all practical purposes, prevent the accused from retain-
ing paid counsel. 82 In addition, since the accused's assets have not been
78. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849
n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court noted that conflicts of interest might arise from the possibility of fee
forfeiture. "[Tlhere is a potential conflict between the interests of counsel and his client regarding the
specific assets that would be subject to forfeiture. The attorney's interest would be for the presevation of
his fees while the client would seek to preserve his own assets." Id. at 850. Nonetheless, the court
concluded "[tlhis conflict may be avoided ... by bifurcating the trial . . . . Defendant could retain
or be appointed independent counsel to represent his interests at the forfeiture proceeding." Id.
The Payden court was also not persuaded that requiring defense counsel to disclose fee information
would chill the relationship of trust and confidence between the accused and his attorney. Payden, 605
F. Supp. at 846-48. The court held first, that fee information was not protected by the Second Circuit's
interpretation of attorney-client privilege, id., and second, that "[tlhe mere disclosure by defense
counsel of [fee] information that is adverse to the defendant does not affect counsel's ability to represent
the defendant effectively as required by the sixth amendment." Id.
79. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
80. United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. lanniello,
No S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Although the Rogers court discusses whether
forfeiture of fees infringes upon an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel within the context of a
pretrial restraining order request, the court does not explicitly base its holding on sixth amendment
grounds. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347-51 (D. Colo. 1985)
81. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316-17; United States v. lanniello, No. S85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Badalatenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-98.
82. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316-17; United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4. 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-98.
Indeed, in most cases counsel for the accused have usually entered only conditional appearances.
their representation of the accused dependent on the court's declaration that fees were exempt from
forfeiture. There is little question that were the court to find attorneys' fees potentially forfeitable they
would refuse to represent the accused any further. See, e.g., Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1308 ("The
lawyers have indicated that their continued appearance in this case is conditioned on their fees being
exempt from forfeiture.").
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frozen, these courts conclude, the accused will not qualify for representa-
tion under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) as an indigent. 83 Unable to retain
counsel due to the threat of forfeiture and unable to qualify for court
appointed counsel, the accused "can get neither a paid lawyer, nor a free
one. "84
Such reasoning, however, assumes its own conclusion. Asserting that
defendants would be unable to qualify for CJA counsel if their potentially
forfeitable assets were not restrained, the courts conclude fee forfeiture
would prevent the defendants from obtaining any counsel. Yet, if fees are
forfeitable, courts are not likely to interpret the CJA statute to reach this
assumed impermissible result.
The Criminal Justice Act provides for representation to a person "finan-
cially unable to obtain adequate representation." 85 A logical interpretation
of this statutory standard within the RICO forfeiture context is that threat of
fee forfeiture renders an accused practically indigent with respect to hiring
counsel. Certainly courts have recognized that for all practical purposes a
RICO defendant would be unable to retain paid counsel if fees were
forfeitable. 86 A court faced with a request for court appointed counsel from
a RICO defendant would, therefore, be justified in concluding that he was
"effectively" indigent for the purposes of obtaining an attorney, and order
the appointment of CJA counsel. Moreover, if attorneys' fees were forfeita-
ble, a court would be even more likely to interpret the CJA to enable a RICO
defendant to qualify for appointed counsel in view of the sixth amend-
ment's express guarantee of counsel to criminal defendants.
In any event, it is not certain that a RICO defendant would be unable to
retain paid counsel if attorneys' fees were forfeitable. 87 Clearly, not all
persons accused of RICO violations will be found guilty. Nor is it neces-
sarily true that all of a RICO defendant's assets are potentially forfeitable.
However, even if the accused were able to retain paid counsel, courts have
emphasized, the conflicts of interest created by the threat of forfeiture
would still deny the accused the effective assistance of his retained counsel
83. Bassett, 632F. Supp. at 1316-17; UnitedStatesv. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-98.
The Criminal Justice Act provides that "[e]ach United States district court. . . shall. . .[furnish]
representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (Supp. 1985).
84. Badalamenti, 614 F Supp. at 197; see also Bassett, 632 F Supp. at 1317; United States v.
Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (Supp. 1985).
86. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316-17; United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-98.
87. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197; United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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thereby abridging his right to counsel. 88 Moreover, these courts have
recognized, the threat of fee forfeiture could also convert counsel's fee into
a contingency arrangement in violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 89
b. Fee Forfeiture's Impairment of the Effectiveness of Paid Counsel
Courts have reasoned that potential fee forfeiture would inhibit the
ability of paid attorneys to function as effective advocates for their clients
by creating two possible conflicts of interest. First, the threat of fee
forfeiture would force counsel to choose between their own fee and their
client's best interest in providing legal advice. 90 Second, requiring counsel
to defend their fee in a postconviction forfeiture hearing9' would necessi-
tate the disclosure of privileged matter since counsel would have to prove
they had no reasonable cause to believe that the property with which they
had been paid was subject to forfeiture. 92 If the attorneys advised their
client of the possibility of such disclosure, "the free flow of information
required between attorney and client for an adequate defense would be
chilled, depriving defendant of effective representation under the Sixth
Amendment. ", 93
88. Badalamenti. 614 F. Supp. at 196; United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); see also United States v. Rogers. 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985) (Requiring attorney to defend fee in postconviction hearing threatens
to require attorney "to disclose information obtained from his client [which] will chill the openness of
. . . [those] communications, thereby impinging on the right to counsel.").
89. United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
Thus, the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from representing a client
in a criminal case for a contingency fee. WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2)
(1985).
90. See, e.g., WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1985). For example:
Defense counsel might seek to negotiate a guilty plea by his client, motiviated, not by his
client's best interests, but rather by his own desire to avoid forfeiture of his fee. On the other hand,
if the Government were unwilling to forego forfeiture of the legal fees in exchange for a guilty plea,
the attorney's financial interest might lead him to advise his client to go to trial, hoping for a
favorable forfieture verdict, even if the client's interest in leniency would be served best by plead-
ing guilty.
United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4. 1985) (LEXIS. Genfed library,
Dist. file).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. 1985).
92. Section 1963(m) places the burden of proving one is a bona fide purchaser for value on the
tranferee. Id., Thus, for example, if defense counsel testified that the client told him the fee payment
was from his grandmother's trust account, the government might then ask, "And you believe that.
counsel?" If defense counsel replied affirmatively, the government might then ask. "Well why did you
believe that? Didn't you know X,Y, and Z?" at which point defense counsel might have to testify as to
privileged matter.
93. United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file). Rogers also considered the effects of the threat of fee forfeiture on the effective
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Regardless of whether requiring defense counsel to defend their fee in a
postconviction hearing will necessitate the disclosure of privileged infor-
mation-and at least one court has concluded it would not94-the forego-
ing analysis fails to resolve the entire issue. The analysis simply does not
apply, as courts have recognized, 95 to those situations in which the govern-
ment has sought and obtained a pretrial restraining order on the transfer of
the accused's potentially forfeitable assets. Because the accused's poten-
tially forfeitable assets have been frozen, the assets cannot be used to pay
attorneys' fees. Consequently, no conflicts of interest can possibly arise.
However, if attorneys' fees paid with potentially forfeitable assets are not
subject to forfeiture, then logically the government should not be able to
restrain the accused from using these assets to pay attorneys' fees. Other-
wise, the court holds that potentially forfeitable funds paid to an attorney
are not forfeitable, but the court precludes the accused from using these
assets to pay his attorney merely because the government had the foresight
to seek a restraining order. At best, such analysis does not address the
problem; at worst, it makes the forfeitability of fees turn on artificial and
arbitrary distinctions.
The legal gyrations engendered by this analysis are exemplified by the
rationale adopted in United States v. Ianniello.96 In Ianniello the court held
that potentially forfeitable assets paid to an attorney were not forfeitable
based on the right to counsel and conflicts of interest rationale. 97 However,
the defendant had also petitioned the court to exempt from a subsequently
imposed pretrial restraining order further payments to his attorney.
The court modified the restraining order to release potentially forfeitable
assets for the purpose of paying defense counsel, but did so on a "necessity
of life" rationale. 98 The court reasoned that counsel had been retained long
before the grand jury indictment, that complex issues of law were involved,
and that extensive motions had been submitted on behalf of the defendants.
Therefore, to deprive the defendants of their attorneys' assistance would
deprive them of a "necessity of life. " 99
assistance of retained counsel. But the court's discussion was in the context of the effect on the
accused's right to counsel of one's own choice. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D.
Colo. 1985). See infra text accompanying notes 101-04.
94. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839,849
n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
95. United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
96. No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The court's actions represent a tacit admission that the defendant should
be able to reach potentially forfeitable assets to pay attorneys' fees. How-
ever, unable to apply the right to counsel rationale to reach this result, the
court summarily concluded that the accused's counsel was a "necessity of
life" and modified the restraining order. The court's inability to resolve the
apparent conflict within a logical framework demonstrates the imprac-
ticability of attempting to answer the fee forfeiture question with a right to
assistance of counsel analysis.
2. Right to Counsel of Choice
Although nearly all circuit courts of appeals have recognized at least a
qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice, 100 only one district
court, in United States v. Rogers, 101 has explicitly considered whether
forfeiture of attorneys' fees would unconstitutionally infringe on the ac-
cused's right to counsel of choice. 102 The Rogers court held that forfeiture
of attorneys' fees would infringe on the accused's right to counsel of choice
in two respects. First, pretrial threat of fee forfeiture, or restraint of
potentially forfeitable assets to pay fees, prevents the accused from using
his assets to secure counsel of his choice. 103 Second, requiring paid counsel
to defend their fee at a postconviction hearing, the Rogers court reasoned,
would necessitate disclosures that would chill the openness of attorney-
client communications, thereby inhibiting the full and effective assistance
of one's chosen counsel. 104
However, other courts have concluded the right to counsel of choice is
not infringed by forfeiture of fees. The court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
100. See supra note 77.
101. 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
102. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348. lanniello discusses this issue briefly, but does not rest its
holding on these grounds. United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("[This court] need not determine, however, whether forfeiture of
attorneys' fees unreasonably infringe upon defendants' right to counsel of their own choice.").
Although the Bassett court also discusses this issue, the basis of its holding is unclear. United States v.
Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316-17 (D. Md. 1986).
103. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. The court reasoned that since "[slection 1963 does not provide
for the forfeiture of assets legitimately transferred to attorneys in return for services rendered."
restraining the transfer of such assets infringes on the accused's right to counsel of choice. Id.
The Rogers court was not persuaded by the government's argument that if the accused had no
legitimate source of assets, he was not entitled to retained counsel of his choosing. The court stated that
"for the government to demand that an individual possess an isolated trust account as a condition of
retaining counsel places too high a burden on the right to counsel" of choice. Id.
104. Id. The court was also unpersuaded that retained counsel's disclosures at a postconviction
hearing in defense of his fee could be limited to nonprivileged information. Rather, the court believed, it
would require inquiry into the the attorneys' knowledge about the scope and source of their client's
assets, information "central to the government's case at trial" and therefore within the scope of
attorney-client privilege. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
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Dated January 2, 1985 (United States v. Payden),10 5 focusing on the
relation back feature of RICO forfeiture, concluded that "the major flaw [in
the Rogers analysis] is that it is not certain that the funds used to pay the
attorney belonged to the defendant." 106 Therefore, a restraint on potentially
forfeitable assets or the forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not unconstitu-
tionally infringe on the accused's right to counsel of choice. Since the
assets did not necessarily belong to the accused, the Payden court asserted,
he had not been prevented from using his assets to secure counsel of his
choice. 107 Further, the court was not convinced that disclosure of fee
information at a postconviction hearing would unconstitutionally chill the
attorney-client relationship so as to prevent the effective assistance of the
defendant's chosen counsel. 108
An analysis of the fee forfeiture issue through the right to counsel of
choice is ill-advised. The nature and extent of the right to counsel of choice
is as yet too uncertain to resolve the fee forfeiture issue. Although most
circuit courts have recognized a qualified right to counsel of choice,10 9 they
have done so almost exclusively within the context of unquestionably
solvent defendants.
The right to counsel of choice issue has arisen mainly within the context
of requests for trial court continuances. 10 In each of these cases the
financial ability of the defendant to retain counsel was unquestioned. The
issue they have considered is whether the trial court's action in denying the
motion "arbitrarily and unreasonably interfere[d] with a client's right to be
represented by the attorney he has selected.""' The resolution of the issue
105. 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
106. Payden, 605F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
107. Id. The right to counsel of choice extends no further than the accused's own financial
resources. See, e.g. United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 988 (1974).
108. Id.
109. See supra note 77.
110. A defendant may request a continuence because his initial counsel withdrew, see, e.g., United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); because he wishes
to secure different counsel, see, e.g., Urquhart v. ,Lockhart, 726 F2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984);
because his newly engaged counsel requires additional time to prepare for trial, see, e.g., Linton v.
Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162(1982); or because his chosen counsel
is unable to be present at trial due to scheduling conflicts, see, e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95,
106-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
In Linton, for example, the defendant was charged with five felony counts of kidnapping and rape.
656 F.2d at 208. He was initially represented by retained counsel and the trial date was set for 10 days
after arraignment. At arraignment defense counsel requested a continuance in order to adequately
prepare for trial. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant's retained counsel consequently
withdrew and defendant was represented by appointed counsel at trial. Defendant appealed his
conviction on a writ of habeus corpus claiming his right to counsel of choice had been unconstitu-
tionally abridged. Id. The Sixth Circuit agreed. Id. at 211.
111. Linton, 656 F.2d at 209.
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requires balancing the interest of the government and society in efficient
judicial administration with the defendant's right to retain counsel of his
choice. 112
The forfeitability of attorneys' fees raises a completely different set of
problems. Although the financial ability of the accused was assumed in
these right to counsel of choice cases, it is directly at issue in an analysis of
the forfeitability of fees. 113 Central to a determination of the forfeitability of
attorneys' fees under RICO is a resolution of whether the government,
through the restraint of potentially forfeitable assets or the threat of fee
forfeiture, may directly affect the accused's financial resources available to
engage counsel. The circuit courts have simply not addressed this issue. 114
The Supreme Court is similarly unenlightening on the nature and extent
of the right to counsel of choice. Although in Powell v. Alabama 115 the
Court recognized that the sixth amendment includes a right to counsel of
one's choice, 116 the Court has rarely considered the nature and extent of this
right. Rather, the Court has focused its attention on outlining the nature and
extent of indigent defendants' sixth amendment right to counsel. 117
3. Inability of Sixth Amendment Considerations to Resolve the Fee
Forfeiture Issue
The forfeitability of attorneys' fees issue puts the two counsel rights
provided by the sixth amendment directly in conflict with one another. A
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
114. Criminal tax defendants have challenged the summary imposition of IRS tax liens on their
property prior to trial on the criminal tax charges as an infringement of their right to counsel of choice
(the lien prevents the defendants from utilizing the property to pay their attorneys' fees or other costs of
mounting a defense to the criminal tax charges). However, the circuit courts have not resolved these
challenges through an analysis of the demands of the sixth amendment. Rather, the courts have
sidestepped the issue by holding that it cannot be resolved before trial. See, e.g., Avco Delta Corp. v.
United States, 484 F.2d 692, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); Lloyd v.
Patterson, 242 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). At least one commentator has suggested that the fee forfeiture issue
should be resolved in a similar fashion. See Brikey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO
and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 525-34 (1986).
115. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
116. The Court stated that it "is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell, 287 U.S.
at 53. Although this case was actually decided on fourteenth amendment grounds, it is now generally
cited for the proposition that the right to be represented by counsel of one's own choice is implicit in the
sixth amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Linton, 656 F.2d at 208; see also
Brikey, supra note 117, at 506 n.57 ("federal courts consistently cite [Powell v. Alabama] for the
proposition that the right to counsel of one's choice is an implicit sixth amendment guarantee").
117. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932).
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defendant has the right to engage counsel of his choice if he is financially
able to do so. This, the Supreme Court has said, derives from the amend-
ment's embodiment of the American colonists' rejection of English crimi-
nal practice. 118 Similarly, if a defendant is unable to afford counsel, the
sixth amendment guarantees that he will be provided an attorney by the
court. This right, the Supreme Court has indicated, derives from the sixth
amendment's embodiment of the requisite features of a fair criminal
trial.'l 9 The forfeiture of attorneys' fees and the pretrial restraint of assets
enables the government to directly affect the accused's financial ability to
retain counsel. However, if fees are forfeitable and the defendant con-
sequently qualifies for appointed counsel, the sixth amendment's counsel
guarantee ensuring a fair trail would appear to be met. In this context, it
cannot be discerned where the right to counsel of choice ends, or whether
the sixth amendment guarantee is wholly satisfied by the provision of court
appointed counsel. A balancing of the two rights is required. The sixth
amendment does not provide a sufficient framework within which to
conduct this balancing.
The problems inherent in attempting to analyze fee forfeiture in terms of
a right to counsel of choice are exemplified by the Rogers opinion. 120 The
court engaged in little or no analysis of the nature and extent of the right to
counsel of choice. Nor did the court discuss, other than in a conclusory
fashion, how forfeitability of attorneys' fees infringes on this right. Rather,
the court simply began with the premise that RICO "does not provide for
the forfeiture" of attorneys' fees. 121 The court then summarily concluded
that to "retort to the claim of denial of counsel of one's choice, that
appointed counsel is available, pays no more than lip service to . . . the
right to counsel." 122 Basically, the court reasoned that since attorney's fees
are not forfeitable, assets used to pay an attorney cannot be frozen by a
pretrial restraining order. Permitting the government to restrain the transfer
of such assets is, therefore, an infringement of the accused's right to
counser of choice. This analysis cannot withstand critical examination.
118. Powell, 287 U.S. at 60-65. See also W. LAAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 474 (1985)
("As a result of the rejection of the English common law rule, the defendant had gained a right to be
represented by counsel provided at his own expense. This right to retained counsel, reflected in the Sixth
Amendment. . . recognized the defendant's freedom of choice in the use of his resources to obtain that
form of representation that he deemed best suited for his defense.").
119. SeeArgersinger, 407 U.S. at 37; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 118, at 474 ("The constitutional right to appointed counsel,
on the other hand, arose out of the state's obligation to provide a fair hearing.").
120. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
121. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985). The premise was based on
the court's reading of the amendments' legislative history. Id. at 1347.
122. Id.
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The sixth amendment is inadequate to resolve the fee forfeiture issue.
Forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not necessarily prevent the accused from
obtaining counsel. Further, the courts' sixth amendment resolution of fee
forfeiture, based on whether the accused's potentially forfeitable assets
have been restrained, is artificial. Finally, the extent of the right to counsel
of choice is too unclear to provide an adequate basis for resolving the fee
forfeiture issue.
D. The Fifth Amendment
The primary issue to be resolved when considering the forfeitability of
attorneys' fees is whether the government can legitimately affect the
accused's financial ability to retain counsel through the relation back
doctrine of RICO forfeiture. The amendments provide that government
ownership of the assets relates back to the time of the defendant's RICO
violations, yet the determination of the defendant's guilt is not made until
the time of trial. 123 The issue is essentially one of fairness and requires
balancing the accused's interest in using potentially forfeitable assets for
payment of attorneys' fees against the government's interest in forfeiture of
those assets. For these reasons, fee forfeiture is best resolved through an
analysis of the requirements of the fifth rather than the sixth amendment.
1. Judicial Treatment of Fifth Amendment Considerations
Few courts have analyzed fee forfeiture within the context of the fifth
amendment. Indeed, only the Rogers'2 4 court has considered the forfeiture
of attorney's fees in terms of the requirements of due process under the fifth
amendment. 125 Rogers began its fifth amendment analysis by noting that
American jurisprudence and criminal justice rely on an adversarial system
of justice. 126 Within this context, an essential element of due process is "a
balance of forces between the accused and his accusor. ' 127 The court
123. The Payden court correctly focused on this when, in response to the Rogers holding that
forfeiture of attorneys' fees infringes on the accused's right to counsel of choice, the court stated that the
"major flaw in this [holding] is that it is not certain that the funds used to pay the attorney belonged to
the defendant. " In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp.
839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
124. 602 F.Supp. 1332 (D.Colo. 1985).
125. The fifth amendment provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
126. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
127. Id. at 1350 (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)); see also Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free.").
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emphasized that this was particularly true in the context of RICO prosecu-
tions where "the defense of RICO accusations requires marshalling of facts
and information of vast quantities perhaps constituting the whole of several
worldwide business enterprises." 128
The Rogers court held that forfeiture of attorneys' fees would violate this
balance and "undermine the very principles underlying the adversary
system.' 1 29 An interpretation of the amended RICO statute permitting
forfeiture of fees would provide the government with the "ultimate tactical
advantage of being able to exclude competent defense counsel as it
chooses." 130 While acknowledging a presumption that "most prosecutors
act in good faith," the court concluded that "[d]ue process cannot tolerate
even the opportunity for such abuse of the adversary system.' 131
Rogers' focus on the effect of fee forfeiture on the adversary system,
while important, is insufficient. Although forfeiture of fees could provide
the government with a tool to exclude competent defense counsel as it
chooses, this is not enough to justify excluding fees from forfeiture.
Prosecutors have wide-ranging discretion to employ most, if not all,
prosecutorial tools at their disposal. The remedy for prosecutorial abuse of
fee forfeiture, like any other prosecutorial abuse of discretion, is readily
available in the courts. TheRogers court asserts in a conclusory fashion that
due process cannot permit the potential for such abuse. 132 Ultimately,
Rogers concludes that fee forfeiture is unfair and therefore violative of due
process.
2. Deriving a Workable Fifth Amendment Analysis from Mathews v.
Eldridge
The fallacy of the fifth amendment analysis in Rogers is that what is
unfair to one judge is not necessarily unfair to another. In Mathews v.
Eldridge, 133 the Supreme Court noted that "due process, unlike some legal
128. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. Indeed, the government's allegations inRogers spanned a period
of seven years and covered activities on three continents. Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 8, United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
129. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
130. Id. The decision to seek a forfeiture count in a RICO indictment, a pretrial restraining order on
an accused's potentially forfeitable assets, or the specific forfeiture of attorneys' fees are all made at the
discretion of the government. Consequently there is little to prevent the government from using these
tools "to exclude competent defense counsel as it chooses." Id. Indeed, counsel engaged by Rogers had
previously successfully defended him in a federal prosecution in California. Amicus Curiae Brief of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 16 n.*, United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
131. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350 ("It is not consistent with due process to create a situation which
eliminates the adversary from the adversarial process.").
132. Id.
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances." 134 The Court outlined the logic necessary to
determine what due process requires within a given factual context. Al-
though Mathews was concerned with the requirements of due process in the
context of administrative proceedings, the Court's reasoning can usefully
be applied to the fee forfeiture issue. The Court stated:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consid-
eration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 135
The first factor to be considered in the Mathews test is the private
interests at stake in the official action. In a RICO action the accused stands
to lose his liberty, his property, and his reputation if convicted. The
accused's interest at stake in a RICO criminal trial could not be of any
greater importance. The accused risks a conviction and a prison sentence.
RICO imprisonment terms are among the stiffest permitted under the
federal penal statutes. 136 Due to the nature of RICO's criminal forfeiture
penalty, the accused could lose not just property used in his illegal activity,
but potentially his entire estate. 137 Finally, if convicted, the accused is
permanently branded as both a felon and a "racketeer."1 38
The second Mathews factor is whether the procedure being requested
will enhance the reliability of the outcome. Enabling a defendant to use
potentially forfeitable assets to retain an attorney of choice will enhance the
trial process. As several courts have noted, RICO criminal prosecutions
involve complex legal issues, cover activities typically of several years
duration, and require "the marshalling of facts and information of vast
quantities perhaps constituting the whole of several worldwide business
enterprises." 139 The public defenders' assets and time are severely con-
strained, while private counsels' are not. Moreover, the public defender's
lack of experience leaves the accused less equipped to defend against a
134. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
135. Id. at 335.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 1985) (permitting sentences of up to 20 years in duration).
Moreover, courts have upheld the imposition of cumulative sentences for both RICO offenses and the
underlying predicate offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1042 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1981).
137. See supra note 27.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1981) (prejudicial taint inevitably
surrounds label of "racketeer").
139. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985).
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RICO charge. 140 This is not to say that the public defender can do so little,
but rather, that private counsel can do so much. The public defender cannot
turn away clients, whereas private counsel's time is limited only by the
client's ability to pay. Similarly, private counsel's expenditures for inves-
tigation and research is limited solely by the client's resources and ap-
proval. The public defender, on the other hand, must obtain court approval
before making any such expenditure.141 Finally, the accused's trust and
confidence placed in his attorney will be enhanced when represention is by
an attorney of choice. The accused's use of potentially forfeitable assets to
retain experienced private counsel can only serve to improve the quality of
the adversary proceeding, which is at the heart of a trial court's search for
truth. Indeed, the public interest is ultimately served by a vigorous defense.
The final Mathews factor to be considered is the government's interest in
forfeiting attorneys' fees and the burden that allowing an accused to use
these assets would impose on the government. The government's sole
legitimate interest in forfeiture is separating the criminal from her ill-gotten
gains and removing the sources of her illegal influence over legitimate
enterprises. 142 This interest is served regardless of whether the assets are
forfeited to the government or are paid to the accused's attorney; in either
event, the defendant has been separated from his illegal gains. Thus, the
government's interest in forfeiture is not harmed by exempting attorneys'
fees.
3. Scope of the Fifth Amendment's Protection
Forfeiture is a penal sanction, not a device for the production of revenue.
Punishment is imposed only after the determination of guilt. Until such
determination, the adversary process is only enhanced by permitting a
defendant to present his defense as effectively as possible.
140. An informal poll, conducted by the author, of the federal public defenders in California,
Oregon, and Washington disclosed few cases in which the office of the public defender had provided
counsel to RICO defendants. Moreover, the experience level varied widely among the offices. For
example, the San Francisco office reported RICO and CCE cases average less than 5% of the office's
caseload, whereas the Seattle office has yet to handle a RICO or CCE case.
141. The Criminal Justice Act empowers the court, not the accused or his attorney, to determine
what services other than counsel are necessary for an adequate defense. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l)
(1982). See, e.g., United States v. Walborn, 730 F.2d 192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 147 (1984)
(court refused to pay for a fingerprint expert).
142. The government does have an interest in 1reventing a criminal from using the fruits of
unlawful activity to his benefit. But the purpose of the trial is to determine whether, in fact, the
defendant violated the statute which subjects what is otherwise undeniably the defendant's property to
forfeiture. Although the relation back doctrine passes title to the government at the time of the illegal
act, this is only a legal fiction. Effectively, it is the conviction that passes title, not the commission of a
RICO violation.
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This is not to say that a RICO defendant must always be allowed to utilize
potentially forfeitable assets to pay her attorney. The test is a balancing one.
If the defendant has nonforfeitable assets, the interest of the government
would seem to outweigh that of the defendant, who should be required to
exhaust those assets first. When potentially nonforfeitable assets have been
exhausted, the balance of interests favors the accused, who should then be
allowed to reach those assets. In either event, due process analysis provides
the flexibility to resolve a mixed asset problem.
The application of the Mathews analysis in Ianniello4 3 would have
enabled the court to reach a well-reasoned and logically consistent result
without resort to the artificial "necessity of life" rationale. Provided that
Mr. lanneillo had exhausted his nontainted assets prior to imposition of the
restraining order, application of the Mathews test would have resulted in
exempting further payments to his attorney from the restraining order. If he
had not, the court should not have allowed him to reach his potentially
forfeitable assets. Thus, the Mathews test would have provided a logically
consistent framework for determining whether Mr. lanniello should have
been allowed to use his potentially forfeitable assets in his own defense.
Finally, while insufficient analytically to resolve the fee forfeiture issue,
the Rogers court's concern with prosecutorial abuse nonetheless underlines
the necessity of attorneys' fees exemption from forfeiture in order to
preserve the degree of fairness required by due process. In their zeal to
punish the guilty, prosecutors sometimes lose sight of the legitimate and
essential function that the private defense bar serves in achieving the trial's
objective of ascertaining the truth. 144 Indeed, in Virgina, federal pros-
ecutors have recently threatened attorneys representing defendants who
have refused to cooperate with law enforcement authorities with fee for-
feiture, but have not sought fee forfeiture from attorneys whose clients have
cooperated with law enforcement authorities. 145 Due process and the adver-
sary system are little served by such coercive abuses of RICO's criminal
forfeiture penalties.
143. United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library. Dist. file).
144. The Justice Department's guidelines for the forfeiture of attorneys' fees cannot and do not cure
the due process problems inherent in forfeiture of attorneys' fees. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-111.530, reprinted in 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3006 (Oct. 2, 1985).
First, it is not clear they will prevent prosecutorial abuse, but merely shift the level where the potential
for abuse lies. Second, the guidelines are only administrative procedures and therefore are not a
substitute for the Mathews' interest balancing test.
145. Tarlow, Rico Report, CHAMPION, June 1986, at 23.
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III. CONCLUSION
Neither legislative history nor statutory language requires the inclusion
or exclusion of attorneys' fees from RICO forfeiture. Likewise, the sixth
amendment's right to counsel, upon which some courts have relied, does
not adequately resolve the issue. Instead, fifth amendment due process
analysis provides the requisite constitutional framework to resolve the fee
forfeiture issue. Fifth amendment considerations compel recognition of a
due process right of the accused to use potentially forfeitable assets in his
own defense, where the accused has no other assets available for that
purpose. In view of the substantial interests a RICO defendant has at stake,
the enhanced safeguards a vigorous defense will provide, and the absence
of significant governmental interests in forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the
Mathews due process test requires that attorneys' fees not be subject to
forfeiture.
Tim Tracy
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